Asymmetric schemes belong to second generation of watermarking. Whereas their need and advantage are well understood, many doubts have been raised about their robustness. According to a method presented in [1], a very robust symmetric technique is derived into an asymmetric scheme. Tests show that it is as robust as the symmetric version. Yet, asymmetric schemes undergo malicious attacks that confuse the detection process. Tests reveal that the quality loss due to these malicious attacks is too important for the signal to be used after the attack.
INTRODUCTION
To build a copy protection system for consumer electronic devices, we are looking for a technique, which could embed in an original content a signal commonly called watermark.
Compliant devices such as players or recorders are able to detect the presence of this watermark. In this particular case, its presence means that the content is protected and thus it is illegal to copy it. This embedded watermark must not be perceptible.
To assess the security of watermarking, we made a threat analysis of these techniques. Some achieve good results in non-perceptibility and robustness, and all of them are symmetric schemes. Symmetric means that the detection process make use of the parameters used by the embedding process. The knowledge of these parameters allow pirates to forge illegal contents by modifying or removing watermark. This set of parameters is called the secrete key and must be stored safely. This is not possible in consumer electronics. Tamper proof device is too expensive. This is the reason why asymmetric watermarking schemes inspired from the cryptography domain have been recently studied ([l], [2] and [3]). They should be as robust as symmetric techniques with a detector needing a set of parameters called the public key different from the embedding's secret key. Knowing the public key, it should be neither possible to deduce the private key nor possible to remove the watermark.
In this paper, we choose a symmetric technique achieving very good results in robustness. According to our method, we render it asymmetric. The first issue is to test the derived technique against common image transformations. The main result is that this derived technique is almost as robust as the symmetric one. The second issue is the vulnerability against malicious attacks. These attacks are specific of the asymmetric method, but their visual impact depends on the watermarking technique.
ALGORITHMS
We describe in this section the algorithms of the symmetric technique, its derivation into a public key scheme, and its human perceptual model. Notation comes from Cox and al. article [4] .
The symmetric technique
In this subsection, we give the technical details about the implementation of the symmetric technique invented by Alessia De Rosa and al. 151. Its robustness is impressive, especially with the optimal version of the detector.
From a cover content CO belonging to the "media space" the extraction function X ( . ) maps cover data into a vector in the "watermark space": ro = X ( C o ) . The "media space" is the spatial domain. X ( . ) orders in a vector r, a subset of the magnitude of N discrete Fourier transform coefficients of Co. These coefficients are extracted between the k-th and the (k + n)-th diagonal in the first quadrant and their symmetrical images in the second quadrant [5]. They are ordered in a pseudo random manner, so that we can assume the sequence {r,[m]} is a white stationary process.
The role of the "mixing function" f(.) is to modify the extracted vector ro into a vector r, which is sufficiently similar to the watermark signal w: r , = f(r,,w). In this technique, it modifies the amplitude of the DFT coefficients stored in ro proportionally to their value: The application of the "inverse extraction" function Y ( . ) concludes the embedding process. It maps back from the "watermark space" to the "media space": C, = Y(r,, CO). Here, Y ( . ) copies the DFT coefficients of CO and changes the amplitude of those used a t the extraction according to the watermarked vector r,.
The asymmetric version
In [l], we described a method allowing to derive an asymmetric technique from classical spread spectrum ones. The detection process does not compare the extracted signal r,, to a specific signal w, but checks if r,, has a specific statistical property due to the presence of w. Under several conditions, one can even demonstrate that it is not possible to estimate it from r w . In this asymmetric scheme, the signal w is a filtered Gaussian central white noise o with unity variance:
The normalized filter h and the signal v are private parameters.
The detection process does not need these private parameters, but it needs the amplitude of the frequency response of the filter h. This public parameter IH(f)l characterizes the expected statistical property: the spectrum of T,, is shaped by l H ( f ) l z . A simple hypothesis test decides to which hypothesis the unknown content C, is more likely to belong: 0 310: The extracted signal r,, is not watermarked, so it does not share this specific statistical property: its estimated spectrum go(f) is flat (we assumed that r0 is a white stationary processes). Finally, the power spectral density expected if 311 is true, is:
Thus, under this hypothesis, the estimated spectrum g1 (f) of the extracted central signal r,, is shaped like IH(f)I2.
The critical region R'(IH(f)I2) is the set of extracted vector of the "watermark space" sharing this specific statistical property. It depends only on the public parameter, and can be defined as follows:
where U(ru, gi) is the Whittle's principal part of the likelihood that the spectrum of the random process T,, matches the power spectral density gi(f). Its simplified expression is ~( r , , , g i ) = 2NJ_"1(log(gi(f)) + IN(f)/gi(f)).df where 
Human perception model
Up to now, the watermark's invisibility issue is only tackled by the embedding depth y. But, this action is very limited because the watermark signal, once mapped in the media space, is spread all over the image. Uniform areas of the image are very sensitive to watermark addition so they only support extremely small embedding depth y, whereas edge areas, for instance, support deeper watermark addition. This issue leads to a spatial domain based human perceptual model giving the amount of noise each pixel can support. We selected the human perception model proposed by Bartolini and al. [6] . This empirical human perception model gives good experimental results. It is based on the computation of the variance of the 9 x 9 windowed signal and by normalizing the obtained arrays with respect to its 
TESTS OF ROBUSTNESS
CO is the 512 * 512 pixels image "Lena". The quality factor Q of the JPEG compression scheme varies from 100% to 0%. Detector's response is normalized model to increase the quality of their forged contents as done in the embedding process (see subsection 2.3).
Adding filtered noise
The strategy of the pirate here is to whiten the sequence ry 
This means
The minimum value for g$ is y2&, max(lH(f)12). This defines the following parameters. so that for Q = loo%, its response is set to 1. Fig.1 plots averaged results to a quality factor from 0% to 30%. Detection performs well until Q = 5%. The symmetric technique robustness quality factor were Q = 5% with a correlation detector and Q = 3% with the optimum decoding. 
Noise Addition

Malicious attacks
The pirate knows exactly the detection process, especially what the detector is looking for. So, he can forge a pirated content C, that the detector does not classify as watermarked. The asymmetric technique is robust to these malicious attacks if the quality of pirated contents is so poor that they have no commercial value. B. Chen The attacks introduced hereafter give very bad quality pirated contents. But, they succeed in confusing the detection process. Pirates will surely use a human perception
D(C0,CW) '
The pirate creates a filter h' which matches the required spectrum IH'(f)I2. The distortion penalty measure is then:
This gives us a clue how to design the filter h. We must maximize 2, choosing h as selective as possible.
Anti-Filtering
The strategy of the pirate here is to whiten the sequence rUl with a whitening filter h". Hence, he will not add some noise but he will withdraw some energy in each frequency bins to render the power spectral density as flat as possible.
The extracted vector of the pirated content is rP = h!' @vu with a filter h" whose frequency response must match with the spectrum:
The penalty distortion measure can not be calculated precisely because it depends on the watermarked content and on the choice of the filter h". A fair approximation is D N 2.
Spectral whitening
The pirate whitens T, in the spectral domain. tracted vector of the pirated content is
The exwhere F is the discrete Fourier transform. This achieves the same goal as the previous subsection, except that the phase of the Fourier transform is not changed. The penalty distortion measure can not be calculated precisely because it depends on the watermarked content. A fair approximation is 2, 2: 2. 
Results on malicious attacks
As described above, it is easy to create from r , an extracted vector r p which the detector does not classify as watermarked. But, it is extremely difficult to predict what is the visual impact of the attack. In the same way, it is extremely difficult to predict what is the impact of the human perceptual model in the detection result. This stems from the fact that the detection occurs in the "watermark space" and that the human perception model acts in the "media space". To go from one space to the other, one processes a DFT and especially a pseudo random permutation (see 2.1), so that it is extremely cumbersome if not impossible to translate the perceptual model in the "watermark space". Fig.2 is the results of the attack described in subsection 3.2.2. After the perceptual model, the result is showed in Fig.3 . Fig.4 plots the outputs of the detection process for different watermark powers y. With the first image, the detection process does not find a value of y so that its output is positive. Hence, it concludes that the image is not watermarked. On the second image, it finds a value of y such that its output is clearly positive. Hence, it concludes the image is watermarked. This illustrates the difficulties encountered by the pirate and the importance of the pseudo-random permutation.
CONCLUSION
The high performances against classical image transformations are mainly due to the implementation layout, especially the design of the extraction function X ( . ) . The derivation into an asymmetric technique does not spoil these performances. We also achieved a fair robustness against the malicious attacks designed for this asymmetric method.
This performance highly depends on the design of the filter h. This paper brings credits to the feasibility of asymmetric techniques. The authors are searching more powerful
